A Cyber-Secured Operation for Water-Energy Nexus by Zhao, Pengfei et al.
        
Citation for published version:
Zhao, P, Gu, C, Cao, Z, Xie, D & Teng, F 2020, 'A Cyber-Secured Operation for Water-Energy Nexus', IEEE








© 2020 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other
users, including reprinting/ republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new
collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted components of this
work in other works.
University of Bath
Alternative formats
If you require this document in an alternative format, please contact:
openaccess@bath.ac.uk
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 17. Aug. 2021
TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS 1 
Abstract—The wide implementation of information and 
communication technologies (ICT) cause power system operations 
exposed to cyber-attacks. Meanwhile, the tendency of integrated 
multi energy vectors has worsened this issue with multiple energy 
coupled. This paper proposes a two-stage risk-averse mitigation 
strategy for water-energy systems (WESs), incorporating power, 
natural gas and water systems against false data injection attacks 
(FDIA) under water-energy nexus. The FDIA on individual sub-
systems is modelled through hampering false data integrity to the 
systems. An innovative two-stage risk-averse distributionally robust 
optimization (RA-DRO) is proposed to mitigate uneconomic 
operation and provides a coordinated optimal load shedding scheme 
for the nexus system security. A coherent risk measure, Conditional 
Value-at-Risk is incorporated into the RA-DRO to model risk. A 
Benders decomposition method is used to solve the original NP-hard 
RA-DRO problem. Case studies are demonstrated on a WES under 
water-energy nexus and results show that the effectiveness of the 
method to mitigate risks from potential FDIA and renewable 
uncertainties. This research provides WES operators an economic 
system operation tool by optimally coordinating energy 
infrastructures and implementing reasonable load shedding to 
enhance cybersecurity. 
 
Index Terms—Distributionally robust optimization, false data 
injection attacks, integrated energy system, mitigation strategy, 
risk aversion, water-energy nexus.   
NOMENCLATURE 
The superscript ‘s’ and ‘re’ representing ‘scheduled’ and 
‘regulated’ respectively are omitted in section C. The 
superscript ‘ini’ and ‘ter’ representing initial and terminal 
nodes of power bus, gas and water nodes are also omitted in this 
section to save space. 
A. Indices and sets 
t, T Index and set of time periods.  
𝑏 , 𝐵  Index and set of power buses. 
𝑛 , 𝑁  Index and set of gas nodes. 
𝑤 , 𝑊  Index and set of water nodes. 
𝑖𝑒, 𝐼𝑒  Index and set of generators. 
𝑖𝑔, 𝐼𝑔 Index and set of gas wells. 
wr, WR Index and set of water reservoirs.  
j,  J Index and set of renewable energy sources 
(RES).  
gt, GT Index and set of gas turbines. 
wp, WP Index and set of water pumps. 
𝑙𝑒, 𝐿𝑒 Index and set of power lines. 
𝑙𝑔, 𝐿𝑔 Index and set of gas pipelines. 
𝑙𝑤, 𝐿𝑤 Index and set of water pipelines without 
pumps. 
𝑙𝑤𝑝, 𝐿𝑤𝑝 Index and set of water pipelines with 
pumps. 
𝑘𝑒, 𝐾𝑒 Index and set of power loads. 
𝑘𝑔, 𝐾𝑔 Index and set of gas loads. 
𝑘𝑤, 𝐾𝑤 Index and set of water loads. 
B. Parameters  










Maximum up and down reserve capacity of 
generators, the gas turbine and water 
pumps. 
𝑥𝑙𝑒  Resistance of power line 𝑙𝑒. 
𝑓𝑙𝑒,𝑚𝑎𝑥  Maximum power flow of line 𝑙𝑒. 
𝑃𝑘𝑒,𝑡 , 𝐺𝑘𝑔,𝑡 , 𝑃𝑘𝑤,𝑡 Demand of power, gas and water. 
𝜔𝑗
𝑠(𝑡) Forecasted output of RES j at time t. 
𝐺𝑖𝑔,𝑚𝑎𝑥,
𝐺𝑖𝑔,𝑚𝑖𝑛 
Maximum and minimum output of gas 
source 𝑖𝑔.   
𝑃𝑟𝑙𝑔,𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝑃𝑟𝑙𝑔,𝑚𝑖𝑛 Maximum and minimum pressure of gas 
pipeline 𝑙𝑔.  
𝛾𝑙𝑔  Coefficient for Weymouth equation. 
𝑓𝑙𝑔,𝑚𝑎𝑥 , Maximum gas flow of line 𝑙𝑔. 
𝑐𝑔𝑡 Conversion coefficient for gas turbines. 









Maximum and minimum limits for head 
pressure of water node connected with or 
without water pump. 
𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑝 , 𝑏𝑙𝑤𝑝 Water pump characteristic coefficients.  
𝑅𝑙𝑤𝑝 , 𝑅𝑙𝑤  Head gain and loss coefficients. 
𝜋𝑤𝑝 Water pump efficiency. 
𝑓𝑙𝑤𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑠 , 𝑓𝑙𝑤,𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑠  Water flow limits for water pipeline with 
and without pump. 












𝑐  Cost coefficients of generator 𝑖𝑒.  
𝜆𝑖𝑔  Cost coefficient for output of gas well 𝑖𝑔. 
𝜆𝑤𝑟  Cost coefficient of water purchase. 
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Output of generators , gas turbines and 
water pump power consumption. 
𝜃𝑙𝑒,𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑖 , 𝜃𝑙𝑒,𝑡
𝑡𝑒𝑟   Phase angle at initial and terminal buses.  
𝐺𝑖𝑔 ,𝑡
  Output of gas wells. 
𝑓𝑙𝑒,𝑡
 , 𝑓𝑙𝑔,𝑡
   Power flow and gas flow. 
𝑃𝑟𝑛,𝑡
  Pressure of gas node n.  
𝑓𝑙𝑔,𝐺𝑇,𝑡
 , 𝑃𝑔𝑡,𝑡
  Injected gas flow and output of gas turbine.  
𝑃𝑛,𝑡
𝑃2𝐺  Power consumed by the electrolyser. 
𝐺𝑛,𝑡
ℎ𝑦 
 Gas output for power-to-gas process.  
𝑃𝑤𝑟,𝑡 Water purchase from reservoir. 
ℎ𝑤,𝑡
𝑙𝑤𝑝 , ℎ𝑤,𝑡




𝑙𝑤𝑝  , 
 





 Head loss and gain of water node. 
𝑓𝑙𝑤𝑝,𝑡,
 𝑓𝑙𝑤,𝑡
  Water flow of pipe with and without water 
pump. 
Δ𝑃𝑘𝑒,𝑡 , Δ𝑃𝑘𝑔,𝑡 ,  
Δ𝑃𝑘𝑤,𝑡 




𝑙𝑠  Load shedding of power, gas and water.  
𝜉𝑗,𝑡 Generation of renewable energy sources. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ODERN energy management systems (EMS) with the 
increasing dependence on emerging information and 
communication technologies (ICTs), have massively facilitated the 
high efficiency, reliability and security of the EMS [1]. Meanwhile, 
the increasingly aggressive cyber-attacks are also growing in 
numbers. As a typical arbitrary cyber-attack, false data injection 
attack (FDIA) can be manipulated by adversaries to integrate 
falsified data into  real-time meter measurement and thus to 
affect and mislead the system operators with erroneous 
decisions on operation and control [2, 3].  
Present research work of investigating FDIA on EMS can be 
categorized in terms of the perspective of attackers or system 
defenders. As for attack modelling from adversaries, a class of 
unobservable FDIA are designed assuming the attacker has the 
knowledge of system historical data [4]. A generalized 
framework for investigating the vulnerability of power system 
nonlinear state estimator to FDIA is analysed in [5]. 
Meanwhile, a robust detector model is proposed to check the 
measurement statistical consistency with the ensured 
detectability. From the perspective of system defenders, 
detection modelling and corresponding algorithms have been 
investigated widely. State estimation is of great significance in 
EMS, which provides reliable state estimates for system 
operators on economic dispatch and reliability analysis [6]. 
State estimation is implemented based on redundant 
measurements to filter out corrupted data. Nevertheless, some 
judiciously designed FDIA can be masked and hidden and 
eventually bypass the state estimation.  
Therefore, mitigation strategy for EMS against FDIA is 
considered as the final barrier for defending power systems 
since conventional state estimation is still employed which fails 
to detect stealthy designed FDIA in real practice. The 
mitigation strategy for intra-interval operational security 
against FDIA is proposed in [7]. A dynamic analytical 
framework is designed for analysing the impacts considering 
system variability in the short dispatch interval. Paper [8] 
proposes the mitigation strategy for a unit commitment by using 
a tri-level optimization model and the original problem is 
transformed into a bi-level mixed-integer programming. The 
previous work of the authors proposes a risk and mitigation 
strategy for integrated electricity and gas systems under FDIA 
in a moment-based hierarchical two-stage framework [9]. In 
comparison, the improvements of this paper over [9] are three 
aspects: i) water-energy nexus has gained extensive research 
attention. There is widely investigation of FDIA on power 
systems. However, WESs also require a cyber-secured 
operation scheme against FDIA. Since WESs are more 
vulnerable than power systems or IESs with higher 
interdependencies; ii) the proposed WES is linked closer via 
power-to-gas (P2Gs), gas turbines and water pumps than with 
only one gas turbine. The complex couplings and 
interconnections among power, gas and water systems desire a 
cyber-secured operation scheme; iii) a risk-averse DRO is 
adopted in this paper considering the risk of uneconomic 
operation cost caused by FDIA and renewable uncertainties. 
However, paper [9] lacks risk analysis. Compared with the 
existing risk mitigation strategy against FDIA, the advancement 
of this paper is summarized in TABLE Ⅰ. 
The interdependencies between coupled energy systems have 
been largely promoted due to the rapid demand increase of 
multiple energy and the development of energy conversion 
technologies. Through fully exploiting the interdependency of 
integrated energy systems (IES), existing literature regarding 
IES operation mainly focuses on several aspects: i) economic-
based operation for minimizing operation cost or maximizing 
economic gain under normal conditions, ii) reliability-based 
operation considering risks from reliability issues and iii) 
resilience-based operation strategies against natural disasters. 
Paper [10] proposes an economic system operation for IES 
considering the relief of power and gas flow congestions. The 
distributed optimization outperforms than centralized 
optimization method with parallel data processing. A security-
constrained unit commitment is designed in [11] for enhancing 
the operational reliability of IES considering possible N - k 
contingencies. A two-stage RO is applied and the problem is 
solved by a second-order cone-based Column & Constraint 
Generation (CCG) approach.  
M 
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In recent studies, the novel distributionally robust 
optimization (DRO) is widely deployed to overcome the 
disadvantages of RO and SO. DRO employs partial distribution 
information instead of requiring the specific full knowledge of 
distributions [12, 13]. Meanwhile, it is a data-driven approach, 
which yields less-conservative solutions than RO. A combined 
optimization for integrated electricity and heat systems is 
proposed in [14] considering renewable and ambient 
temperature uncertainties, which are characterized by DRO. 
Paper [15] investigates the operation schemes for energy hub 
systems (EHSs) considering renewable uncertainty and 
multimodality information. 
The uncertainties bring risks into economic operation. 
Intuitively, risks in the proposed WES operation model can lead 
to abnormal high operation cost. Risk-averse optimization 
considers a coherent trade-off between system economic 
performance and risk, which has been applied with SO on 
energy system operation [16, 17]. Paper [16] develops a risk-
averse stochastic programming model for unit commitment 
considering renewable energy uncertainty. A conditional value-
at-risk (CVaR) is incorporated to assess the risk from renewable 
energy uncertainty. In [17], a day-ahead operational planning 
model for a regional energy service provider with electricity 
price uncertainty is proposed. The CVaR criterion is employed 
to hedge against the uncertainty. This paper utilizes a risk-
averse DRO model, which outperforms the existing risk-averse 
SO models with more practical distributional information 
availability. 
Under the era of water-energy nexus, water systems have 
been given higher attention in the recent research works. 
Traditionally, water and power systems are modelled and 
operated separately. However, the two systems are actually 
mutually interdependent [18]. Around 80% of the power 
consumed in water systems is used for pumping and distributing 
water [19]. In power systems, surplus water resources 
significantly contribute to the generation and conversion in 
power systems. The joint optimization of power and water 
systems have been investigated in existing work, targeting at 
reducing operation cost and emissions. An optimal water-power 
usage operation scheme is in [20] considering the couplings in 
an integrated power and water system (IPWS). An alternating 
direction method of multipliers-based optimization is used. 
Paper [21] utilizes the water as an effective resource to manage 
renewable generators combined with demand-side management. 
Very recent work proposes a two-stage robust optimization (RO) 
model for multi energy systems [22]. Wind uncertainty is 
handled and the proposed model is solved by a CCG method. 
In this paper, the proposed water-energy system (WES) 
incorporates power, gas and water systems. It realizes the 
comprehensive coordination between energy infrastructures of 
the three independent systems. The increasing penetration of 
conversion technologies strengthen the coupling and 
interactions between electricity, gas and water systems. The 
interdependency is enhanced, leading to both beneficial and 
adverse impacts for WES. As for the beneficial impacts, the 
relatively lower price of gas sources can provide more 
economic operation solutions for WES; the surplus generation 
in the original independent energy system can supply loads in 
other sub-energy systems based on upcoming energy 
conversions. However, the strong interdependency of WES is 
detrimental to system security, i.e., reliability issues, natural 
disasters and cyber-attacks. The failure on power, gas or water 
systems will inevitably propagate to other sub-systems. 
Accordingly, the uneconomic operation is caused not only 
because of the individual complexities in each sub-system, but 
also due to the tight interdependencies. The higher the 
interdependency in a WES, the more vulnerable the WES is. 
This paper proposes a risk-averse mitigation strategy to 
alleviate the uneconomic operation of WES against potential 
FDIA considering renewable uncertainty. FDIA is assumed to 
target at load meter readings of power, gas and water systems. 
The two-stage framework consists of i) day-ahead operation 
scheme prior to the FDIA and forecasting of renewable 
uncertainty and ii) the implementation of real-time recourse 
actions based on the FDIA and realization of renewable 
uncertainty. Load shedding and scheduling operation are 
considered as the recourse actions to mitigate the impact from 
FDIA. The ambiguity set for capturing the FDIA and renewable 
uncertainty is constructed based on Kullback-Leibler (KL) 
divergence. The coherent risk measure, i.e., CVaR is used to 
balance the trade-off between risk and computational 
performance. The proposed two-stage risk-averse 
distributionally robust FDIA mitigation strategy for WES is 
denoted as TSRA-FMS for simplicity. Bender’s decomposition 
approach is adopted to solve the TSRA-FMS problem.  
The major contributions of this paper are as follows:  
1) This paper develops a mitigation strategy against FDIA for 
WES. The water-energy nexus achieves optimal energy 
coordination under normal conditions but is more vulnerable to 
cyber-attacks. The interdependencies between power, gas and 
water systems are analysed under different FDIA scenarios.    
2) It utilizes a two-stage optimization framework 
TABLE Ⅰ 











 FDIA  
Renewable 
uncertainty 
 Power Gas Water    Power Gas Water  
[4] ✓    Single-stage Deterministic ✓    
[12] ✓    Single-stage Deterministic ✓    
[37] ✓    Single-stage Deterministic ✓    
[13] ✓    Single-stage Robust ✓    
[14] ✓ ✓   Two-stage  DRO ✓ ✓  ✓ 
Proposed ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Two-stage  Risk-averse 
DRO 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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incorporating both day-ahead system operation under normal 
conditions and real-time mitigation scheme against potential 
FDIA. To defend and mitigate the FDIA, capacity reserve from 
generations are scheduled in the first stage and load shedding is 
implemented in the second stage. 
3) The model incorporates CVaR into DRO. This risk-averse 
mitigation method has the benefits of: i) it inherits the 
advantages of RO and SO based on limited uncertainty 
distribution information with weakened robustness, ii) 
compared with moment-based ambiguity set, the ambiguity set 
constructed by KL divergence can flexibly shape the candidate 
distributions of both FDIA and renewable uncertainty and thus 
it yields less-conservative solutions and iii) the trade-off 
between the optimization performance and risk is modelled 
based on the incorporation of CVaR. 
The remaining paper is organized as follows: section Ⅱ 
models three types of FDIA in power, gas and water systems. 
The problem formulation of TSRA-FMS is given in section Ⅲ. 
In section Ⅳ, the methodology of KL divergence-based TSRA-
FMS considering CVaR as the risk measure is proposed. The 
case studies are given in section Ⅴ. Section Ⅵ concludes the 
paper.    
II. ATTACK MODELLING 
This paper considers three types of FDIA and the attack 
modelling is in this section. State estimation is used to provide 
accurate snapshot of power systems and detect FDIA based on 
available measurements. Nevertheless, a stealthy designed 
FDIA can be undetectable and bypass the state estimation. The 
FDIA considered in this paper is designed on corrupting load 
measurement. Equation (1) and (2) show the original expression 
of bus power injection and line flow. The incidence matrices of 
bus-generator and bus-load are represented by 𝐾𝑃 and 𝐾𝐷, 
respectively. The shift factor matrix can be obtained from the 
linearized DC flow equation, which is used to approximate the 
change of active power flow. The incremental matrices of 𝐵𝑃 
and 𝑃𝐿 are given in (3) and (4) due to FDIA.  
𝐵𝑃 = 𝐾𝑃 ∙ 𝐺 − 𝐾𝐷 ∙ 𝐷 (1) 
𝑃𝐿 = 𝑆𝐹 ∙ 𝐵𝑃 (2) 
Δ𝐵𝑃 = 𝐾𝑃 ∙ Δ𝐺 − 𝐾𝐷 ∙ Δ𝐷 (3) 
Δ𝑃𝐿 = 𝑆𝐹 ∙ Δ𝐵𝑃 (4) 
  The following conditions should be satisfied for a successful 
FDIA:  
Condition 1:Δ𝐺 = 0. The attack on the measurement of output 
of generation is ignored since this type of attack can be easily 
detected and corrected. 
Condition 2: Zero injection buses, i.e., buses without generators 
or loads connected, are not attackable. 
Condition 3: Load measurements are attackable. 
Condition 4: The load measurement eventually impacts on 
branch flow measurement. 
The resulting formulation in (5) is obtained based on the 
above conditions: 
Δ𝑃𝐿 = −𝑆𝐹 ∙ 𝐾𝐷 ∙ Δ𝐷 (5) 
As proposed in [23], the FDIA targeting on the load 
measurements increases and decreases some loads 
simultaneously. And the total load is remained unchanged. The 




= 0 (6) 
−𝐴𝐼𝐿 𝐷 ≤ Δ𝐷 ≤ 𝐴𝐼𝐿 𝐷 (7) 
Constraint (8) and (9) limit the original and attacked power 
flow before and after the FDIA. However, in practice, the line 
capacity is always sufficiently large in case of overloading 
issues.  
𝑃𝐿 ≤ 𝑃𝐿 ≤ 𝑃𝐿 (8) 
𝑃𝐿 + 𝑆𝐹 ∙ 𝐾𝐷 ∙ Δ𝐷 ≤ 𝑃𝐿 ≤ 𝑃𝐿 + 𝑆𝐹 ∙ 𝐾𝐷 ∙ Δ𝐷 (9) 
In the real implementation, constraints (10) and (11) are used 
as the explicit expressions of (6) and (7).  
∑ Δ𝑃𝑘𝑒,𝑡
 
= 0 (10) 
−𝐴𝐼𝐿𝑘𝑒𝑃𝑘𝑒,𝑡 ≤ Δ𝑃𝑘𝑒,𝑡 ≤ 𝐴𝐼𝐿𝑘𝑒𝑃𝑘𝑒,𝑡 (11) 
To investigate the system interdependencies under the 
exposure of FDIA, the FDIA on load measurement of gas and 
water systems are additionally considered, which are given in 
(12) and (13).  
−𝐴𝐼𝐿𝑘𝑔𝑃𝑘𝑔,𝑡 ≤ Δ𝑃𝑘𝑔,𝑡 ≤ 𝐴𝐼𝐿𝑘𝑔𝑃𝑘𝑔,𝑡 (12) 
−𝐴𝐼𝐿𝑘𝑤𝑃𝑘𝑤,𝑡 ≤ Δ𝑃𝑘𝑤,𝑡 ≤ 𝐴𝐼𝐿𝑘𝑤𝑃𝑘𝑤,𝑡 (13) 
III. CYBER-SECURED MITIGATION SCHEME 
The proposed two-stage cyber-secured mitigation scheme for 
the uneconomic operation of WES includes: i) day-ahead 
operation scheme prior to the FDIA and renewable uncertainty 
and ii) real-time corrective redispatch scheme and security 
measures under the potential FDIA and the realization of 
renewable uncertainty. This section proposes the objective 
function of the mitigation scheme and the associated 
constraints.    
A. WES Structure 
  The proposed WES structure is shown in Fig. 1, including a 
modified IEEE 30-bus power system, a 20-node gas system and 
a 10-node water system. The power system contains 5 power 
generators and 3 RES generators. Two P2G facilities 
interconnect  RES generators and gas nodes, which converts 
the excessive power energy to hydrogen gas. A gas turbine 
transfers gas from node 8 to bus 13. In the water system, there 
are 2 water reservoirs and 3 water pumps. Water pumps 
connected with nodes 1, 2 and 6 consume power form buses 29 
and 30. The water electrolysers of P2Gs consume water, which 
are supplied from node 5. It is to be noted that the gas and water 
nodes are similar to the electrical buses in power systems. 
Nodes are the points that connect two or more gas pipelines, 
where a certain volume of gas is delivered or injected. A typical 
gas node can be connected with gas pipelines, natural gas 
sources, gas wells, gas storage systems, gas compressors and 
gas loads. In water networks, the water pipelines and nodes are 
similar to the power lines and buses in power networks, which 
are used to describe pipe connections and endings. Water nodes 
in a water network can represent water supplies, storage, pumps 
and loads.  
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B. Objective Function 
The overall objective is to mitigate the uneconomic operation, 
which is separated into a hierarchical day-ahead and real-time 
optimization under normal conditions and FDIA, respectively. 
The structure of the proposed cyber-secured mitigation scheme 
is given in Fig. 2. The objective function of day-ahead operation 
is given in (14), including the i) day-ahead generation cost of 
electricity generators, gas wells, ii) reserve cost of generators, 
gas turbines and water pumps and iii) water purchase cost from 
reservoirs. It is to be noted that the reserve capacity is prepared 
for counteracting impacts from FDIA and renewable 
uncertainty in the second stage. 















− , {∙} = 𝑖𝑒 , 𝑔𝑡, 𝑤𝑝  
 
(14) 
The second-stage sub-objective (15) is implemented under 
the presence of FDIA and renewable uncertainty, which 
involves i) the adjustive decisions on redispatching generators, 
gas wells, RESs and water purchase and ii) minimum joint load 
shedding.   

























C. Day-ahead operation  
The day-ahead operation determines the power generation 
schedule of generators and the reserve dispatch of generators, 
gas turbines and water pumps. The day-ahead operation scheme 
(16)-(39) is based on the renewable forecast without 
considering the risks of FDIA. The reserve capacity of 
generators, gas turbines and water pumps are limited in (16) and 
(17). Constraints (18) and (19) provide the limits of output of 
generators, gas turbines and power consumption of water 
pumps. The DC power flow after the linearization is shown in 
(20) and (21). The power balance constraint is given in (22). 
Equation (23) regulates the output of gas wells.  
In the gas system, gas pressure is constrained in (24). In 
constraint (25), it shows that the pressure at initial nodes are 
always larger than the terminal nodes because the gas system 
considered in this paper is of radial topology. Weymouth gas 
flow equations are given in (26) and (27). Equation (28) is the 
constraint of the output of gas turbines. P2G enables to utilize 
the surplus renewable power generation and convert it to gas. 
Equation (29) shows the gas output via P2G [24]. The gas nodal 
balancing equation is given in (30).  
Equations (31)-(39) are constraints of water system. The 
output of water reservoir is limited in (31). The water pressure 
limit is given in (32) for pipes with and without water pumps. 
Constraints (32)-(44) describes the hydraulic characteristics of 
water pipes with and without water pumps including head gain 
and loss. In (35), the pressure head gain of water pump is 
shown. The hydraulic characteristic of pipes without water 
pumps is given in (36) based on Darcy-Weisbach equation [25]. 
Equation (37) presents the power consumption of water pump. 
The water flow magnitude is limited in (38). And the mass 
balance constraint of water system is presented in (39). 
0 ≤ 𝑟{∙},𝑡
+ ≤ 𝑅{∙}
+ , {∙} = 𝑖𝑒 , 𝑔𝑡, 𝑤𝑝 (16) 
0 ≤ 𝑟{∙},𝑡
− ≤ 𝑅{∙}
− , {∙} = 𝑖𝑒 , 𝑔𝑡, 𝑤𝑝 (17) 
𝑃{∙},𝑡
𝑠 + 𝑟{∙},𝑡
+ ≤ 𝑃{∙},𝑚𝑎𝑥, {∙} = 𝑖𝑒 , 𝑔𝑡, 𝑤𝑝 (18) 
𝑃{∙},𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑃{∙},𝑡
𝑠 − 𝑟{∙},𝑡
− , {∙} = 𝑖𝑒 , 𝑔𝑡, 𝑤𝑝 (19) 
𝑥𝑙𝑓𝑙𝑒,𝑡





 𝑠 ≤ 𝑓𝑙𝑒,𝑚𝑎𝑥









Fig. 2.  The proposed cyber-secured mitigation scheme. 
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  ≤ 𝐺𝑖𝑔,𝑡
𝑠 ≤ 𝐺𝑖𝑔,𝑚𝑎𝑥
  (23) 
𝑃𝑟𝑛,𝑚𝑖𝑛
2   ≤ 𝑃𝑟𝑛,𝑡
𝑠2 ≤ 𝑃𝑟𝑛,𝑚𝑎𝑥
 2  (24) 
𝑃𝑟𝑛,𝑡










 𝑠 ≤ 𝑓𝑙𝑔,𝑚𝑎𝑥
 𝑠  (27) 
𝑃𝑔𝑡,𝑡
 𝑠 = 𝑐𝐺𝑇𝑓𝑙𝑔,𝑔𝑡,𝑡










































= 𝑙𝑤 , 𝑙𝑤𝑝 
(33) 
ℎ̃𝑙𝑤𝑝,𝑡
𝑠 ≥ 0 (34) 
ℎ̃𝑙𝑤𝑝,𝑡
𝑠 + 𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑝𝑓𝑙𝑤𝑝,𝑡
 𝑠  + 𝑏𝑙𝑤𝑝
 = 𝑅𝑙𝑤𝑝𝑓𝑙𝑤𝑝,𝑡
 𝑠 2 (35) 
ℎ̃𝑙𝑤,𝑡
𝑠 = 𝑅𝑙𝑤𝑓𝑙𝑤𝑝,𝑡
 𝑠 2 (36) 
𝑃 𝑤𝑝,𝑡
𝑠 = (𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑝𝑓𝑙𝑤𝑝,𝑡
 𝑠 2 + 𝑏𝑙𝑤𝑝𝑓𝑙𝑤𝑝,𝑡
 𝑠  ) /𝜋𝑤𝑝 
(37) 
0 ≤ 𝑓{∙},𝑡
 𝑠 ≤ 𝑓{∙},𝑚𝑎𝑥



















D. Real-time Cyber-Secured Mitigation 
The cyber-secured mitigation is implemented in the second 
stage to mitigate the uneconomic operation based on the 
realization of FDIA and renewable uncertainty. Equation (40) 
is the regulated output of generators, gas turbines and the 
regulated power consumption of water pumps. Equations (41)-
(44) model the stealthy designed FDIA on power, gas and water 






+ , {∙} = 𝑖𝑒 , 𝑔𝑡, 𝑤𝑝 (40) 
∑ Δ𝑃𝑘𝑒,𝑡
𝑘𝑒∈𝐾𝑒
= 0 (41) 
−𝛽𝑘𝑒𝑃𝑘𝑒,𝑡 ≤ Δ𝑃𝑘𝑒,𝑡 ≤ 𝛽𝑘𝑒𝑃𝑘𝑒,𝑡 (42) 
−𝛽𝑘𝑔𝑃𝑘𝑔,𝑡 ≤ Δ𝑃𝑘𝑔,𝑡 ≤ 𝛽𝑘𝑔𝑃𝑘𝑔,𝑡 (43) 
−𝛽𝑘𝑤𝑃𝑘𝑤,𝑡 ≤ Δ𝑃𝑘𝑤,𝑡 ≤ 𝛽𝑘𝑤𝑃𝑘𝑤,𝑡 (44) 
0 ≤ 𝑃{∙},𝑡
𝑙𝑠 ≤ 𝑃{∙},𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑙𝑠 , {∙} = 𝑘𝑒 , 𝑘𝑔, 𝑘𝑤 (45) 
The rest of the second-stage constraints are not listed due to 
space limitation. The constraints of the second stage are the 
same as the first-stage constraints when the superscript ‘s’ is 
replaced by ‘re’, which denotes the regulated decision 
variables. 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
The proposed TSRA-FMS is a two-stage DRO framework with 
minmax formulation in the second stage problem. The linear 
TSRA-MS is firstly represented by compact form for notation 
brevity. Then the KL divergence-based ambiguity set of DRO is 
constructed to capture the FDIA and renewable uncertainty. In 
section C, the expression of CVaR is given and incorporated in the 
original formulation of TSRA-FMS. Finally, the mathematical 
reformulation is made and the solution algorithm is proposed. 
A. Formulation in Brevity 
Matrices and vectors are used for notation brevity of the TSRA-
FMS problem. The original objective function of TSRA-FMS is 





𝐸𝑝[𝑄(𝑥, 𝜉)] (46) 
The risk-averse DRO incorporates the risk measure in the 
second-stage problem, which is given in (47). The first term 𝑐′𝑥 
is the first-stage objective. The second term (1 − 𝛼)𝐸𝑝[𝑄(𝑥, 𝜉)] 
represents the weighted expected second-stage objective and the 
last term 𝛼𝑅(𝑄(𝑥, 𝜉))  is the weighted risk measure. The 
weighting coefficient 𝛼 ranges between 0 and 1. Equation (50) 





{(1 − 𝛼)𝐸𝑝[𝑄(𝑥, 𝜉)] + 𝛼𝑅(𝑄(𝑥, 𝜉))}   (47) 
s.t. 𝐴𝑥 ≤ 𝑏, (48) 
𝑄(𝑥, 𝜉) = min
𝑦
𝑓′𝑦 (49) 
s.t. 𝐸𝑥 + 𝐹𝑦 + 𝐺𝜉 ≤ ℎ, (50) 
  The first-stage constraints are represented by (48). Equations 
(49) and (50) represent the second-stage objective function and 
constraints, respectively, where the coefficient of (49) is denoted 
by f.  
B. Constructing the Ambiguity Set  
Based on the distance between probability distributions, the 
discrepancy-based ambiguity set can be modelled, where η is the 
divergence tolerance. In (51) and (52), 𝑝 and 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓 are the true 
and reference probability distribution, respectively. Equations (51) 
and (52) are the implicit and explicit descriptions of distribution 
distance.   
𝐷𝑖𝑠 = {𝑝 ∈ 𝐷𝜉,|𝐷𝜉,(𝑝‖𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓) ≤ 𝜂} (51) 





  Equation (54) shows the KL-divergence function of variable a.  
𝜑𝐾𝐿(𝑎): = 𝑎 log 𝑎 − 𝑎 + 1 (53) 
C. Risk-Averse DRO 
CVaR refers to a risk assessment which quantifies the tail risk 
of investment [26]. CVaR is developed to mitigate the 
shortcomings of value at risk. CVaR is initially applied in finance 
industries, which is then extended to portfolio problems in other 
fields, such as power systems [27].  
The probability of 𝑄(𝑥, 𝜉) is limited by the threshold ζ. The 
coherent risk measure CVaR is convex and monotonic. The 
probability of 𝑄(𝑥, 𝜉) not larger than the threshold 𝜁 is shown as: 
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Where 𝛹  is the cumulative distribution function of 𝑄(𝑥, 𝜉) , 
which is a fundamental element of VaR and CVaR. Moreover, is 
continuous and nondecreasing with respect to 𝜁. The definition of 
𝛽-VaR and 𝛽-CVaR are shown as (55) and (56). 








Since 𝑄(𝑥, 𝜉)  is continuously differentiable and convex, the 
below formula can be derived [26, 28].  





𝐸𝑝[𝑄(𝑥, 𝜉) − 𝜁]
+ } (57) 
Where function [𝑄(𝑥, 𝜉) − 𝜁]+ is used to determine the larger 
value between 𝑄(𝑥, 𝜉) − 𝜁 and 0.  
[𝑄(𝑥, 𝜉) − 𝜁]+ = {
𝑄(𝑥, 𝜉) − 𝜁  (𝑄(𝑥, 𝜉) − 𝜁 > 0)
 
0  (𝑄(𝑥, 𝜉) − 𝜁 ≤ 0)
 
(58) 
The original objective function of TSRA-FMS is reformulated 
as (59) with weighted CVaR. When substituting CVaR in (59) with 












{𝛼𝜁 + 𝐸𝑝[𝐺(𝑥, 𝜉)]}  } 
(60) 




s.t.𝑄(𝑥, 𝜉) −  ?̃? − 𝜁 ≤ 0, ?̃? ≥ 0  
When the strong duality holds, (60) can be reformulated to (61) 

















}  } 
 
(62) 
Larange function (63) can be used to handle the inner 
maximization problem with its dual formulation (64). 
ℒ(𝑝, 𝜏, 𝜇) = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝐺𝑖(𝑥, 𝜉)
𝑚
𝑖=1
+ 𝜏 (1 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1













𝐺𝑖(𝑥, 𝜉) − 𝜏
𝜇
) − 1] 
 
(64) 
Based on the Slater’s condition [30], the (65) and (66) can be 



















𝐺𝑖(𝑥, 𝜉) − 𝜏
𝜇
) − 1]} 
 
(66) 
The derivation in (67) can be obtained when substituting the 
inner maximization problem in (62) with (66). 
min
𝜁,𝜏,𝜇≥0




𝐺𝑖(𝑥, 𝜉) − 𝜏
𝜇
) − 1]} 
 
(67) 
s.t. 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑄(𝑥, 𝜉) −  ?̃? − 𝜁 ≤ 0, ?̃? ≥ 0, 




Nevertheless, equation (67) is a nonlinear problem which 
requires to be linearized before the decomposition algorithm. For a 
given 𝑥 = 𝑥𝑘 , when 𝑄(𝑥𝑘 , 𝜉) < ∞ , 𝑄(𝑥𝑘 , 𝜉)  is 
subdifferentiable [31] and (68) can be obtained, where 
𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙(𝑥𝑘) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔max{𝜋′(ℎ − 𝐸𝑥𝑘): 𝐹′𝜋 ≤ 𝑓}  is the set of 
optimal solutions of dual problem in (49). 𝜋𝑘,𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙(𝑥𝑘) is the 
optimal solution for the ith scenario and kth iteration.  






𝑘: = 𝜇𝑘[exp(𝑠𝑘) − 1], the subgradient 
of 𝐹𝑖
𝑘 is given as: 
𝜕𝐹𝑖




Equation (70) can be obtained based on the subgradient 
inequality of convex function. And equation (71) is the optimality 
cut. 
𝐹𝑖
 (𝑥, 𝜇, 𝜏, ?̃?𝑖) ≥ 𝐹𝑖
 (𝑥𝑘, 𝜇𝑘 , 𝜏𝑘, ?̃?𝑖
𝑘) + 𝜕𝐹𝑖
𝑘 ∙ (𝑥 − 𝑥𝑘, 𝜇 − 𝜇𝑘 , 𝜏 − 𝜏𝑘, ?̃?𝑖 − ?̃?𝑖
𝑘) (70) 
𝐹𝑖
 (𝑥, 𝜇, 𝜏, ?̃?𝑖) ≥ [𝐺𝑖(𝑥






𝑘(𝑥  , 𝜇 , 𝜏  , ?̃?𝑖
 ) 
(71) 
Finally, to solve the overall two-stage risk-averse DRO problem, 
a Bender’s decomposition method should be applied.  
V. CASE STUDY 
In this section, the numerical experiments are validated on a 
modified IEEE 30-bus power system, connected with a 20-node 
gas system and a 10-node water system. The WES is given in 
Fig. 1. The RESs are connected at buses 15, 22 and 26 with 
60MW for each output. Two P2G facilities and a gas turbine are 
used for power-gas connection. The water consumption of 
P2Gs is supplied by the water system at node 5. The water 
system has three water pumps, which consume power from the 
power system. TABLEs Ⅱ presents the parameters of water 
reservoirs. Fig. 3 presents the maximum and minimum limits of 
the gas pressure. The load profile of power, gas and water 
systems are shown in Figs. 4-5. For notation simplicity, the 
FDIA at power, gas and water systems are denoted as P-FDIA, 
G-FDIA and W-FDIA, respectively.  
The case illustration is given in TABLE Ⅲ. Case 1 is a 
deterministic operation model of WES without considering 
FDIA or renewable uncertainty. Case 2 utilizes RO to capture 
FDIA. Compared with case 2, case 3 further incorporates 
renewable uncertainty. Cases 4-7 are used to analyse the impact 
under different FDIA scenarios. As the benchmark case, case 7 
considers all the potential types of FDIA (P-FDIA, G-FDIA and 
W-FDIA) with 5% of AIL. In comparison, the AIL of cases 8-
10 gradually increases.  
A. Studies on Economic Performance  
The economic performance for all cases are first analysed 
and the result is given in TABLE Ⅳ. Case 1 has the lowest 
operation cost, i.e., $843986, when no FDIA is conducted. In 
contrast, the operation cost of case 10 is the highest ($2521441) 
when all three types of FDIA are at 20% of AIL. Compared with 
cases 6 and 7, cases 2 and 3 utilize single-stage RO. The results 
of cases 2 and 3 are higher than cases 6 and 7, which implies 
the over-conservatism of RO when considering the worst-case 
FDIA condition. Case 4 only considers the potential impact 
from P-FDIA, which yields the second-lowest solution, i.e., 
$855096. When addition G-FDIA is modelled in case 5, the 
operation cost is $26866 higher than that of case 4. Similarly, 
W-FDIA and renewable uncertainty are additionally considered 
in cases 6 and 7. The AIL is increasing consecutively in cases 7, 
8, 9 and 10 from 5% to 20%. The first and second stage 
operation cost of case 7 are $759910 and $248762, respectively. 
With the increase of AIL, the expected second stage costs 
increase rapidly. In particular, the expected second stage cost 
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increases $637428 from case 9 to 10. Consequently, it can be 
concluded that the increase rate of operation cost is highly 
affected by the AIL.  
B. Studies on Load Shedding  
Load shedding in three sub-systems is implemented to ensure 
the overall system security and maintain the feasibility of the 
proposed mitigation scheme. The optimal coordinated load 
shedding strategy considers power load shedding (PLS), gas 
load shedding (GLS) and water load shedding (WLS) for 24 
hours under different levels of FDIA. Figs. 6-9 present the load 
shedding under different combinations of FDIA. In Fig. 6, it can 
be seen that PLS is affected by both P-FDIA and G-FDIA. PLS 
is not sensitive when the AIL of P-FDIA is below 8%. When G-
FDIA is at 0%, PLS rises from 0MWh to 691MWh; when G-
FDIA is at 20%, PLS rises from 0MWh to 1274MWh. Fig. 7 
shows the GLS under P-FDIA and G-FDIA. The highest GLS, 
589kcf, is obtained when the two types of FDIA are at the 
highest level. When solely conducting G-FDIA,  GLS ranges 
between 400kcf and 589kcf. The PLS under P-FDIA and W-
FDIA is shown in Fig. 8. The highest PLS (1990MWh) is 
implemented at 20% of AIL of P-FDIA and W-FDIA, which 
indicates the higher impact caused by W-FDIA compared with 
G-FDIA in Fig. 6. At the highest level of P-FDIA, increasing 
W-FDIA causes PLS growth from 709MWh to 1990MWh. Fig. 
9 depicts WLS under P-FDIA and W-FDIA. The highest WLS 
is 257m3 at the highest level of P-FDIA and W-FDIA. 
TABLE Ⅱ 









1 325 6.4 -252.5 
2 700 2.6 -255 
 
 

























































































Fig. 6.  Power load shedding under P-FDIA and G-FDIA.    
                  
 
Fig. 7.  Gas load shedding under P-FDIA and G-FDIA.    
    
 
               
 
Fig. 8.  Power load shedding under P-FDIA and W-FDIA. 
 
 
Fig. 9.  Water load shedding under P-FDIA and W-FDIA. 
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Compared with other FDIA scenarios, WLS increases smoothly 
when P-FDIA is at the highest level.  
C. Scalability Analysis 
In this section, the proposed TSRA-FMS is tested in a larger 
system scale to validate the applicability. This WES contains an 
IEEE 118-bus system, a 20-node gas system and a 10-node 
water system according to [32] and [33]. There are 54 power 
generators and 3 RES generators in the power system. RES 
generators are connected with buses 36, 69 and 77 with a 
capacity of 250MW.  This analysis is conducted among 8 
cases to demonstrate i) the effectiveness of TSRA-FMS on IESs, 
ii) comparison between risk-averse DRO and risk-neutral DRO 
and iii) the impact of system interdependency on system 
vulnerability. The case illustration is shown in TABLE Ⅴ. Note 
that ‘system interdependencies’ indicates the number of 
connected gas and water systems in the WES. For instance, in 
case 1, the WES contains 3 gas systems and 3 water systems.  
In Figs. 10 and 11, the water load shedding under cases 4 and 
5 is given. Cases 4 and 5 are used to compare the proposed risk-
averse DRO and risk-neutral DRO of [9]. In Fig. 11, the WLS 
reaches up to 983m3 when P-FDIA and W-FDIA are both under 
20% of AIL. When P-FDIA is not considered, the highest AIL 
of W-FDIA causes 77 m3 WLS. Compared with Fig. 10, the 
risk-averse DRO presents a higher WLS than that of risk-
neutral DRO, i.e., the WLS is 1168 m3 under 20% of P-FDIA 














1 Deterministic No No No No 0% 
2 RO Yes Yes Yes No 5% 
3 RO Yes Yes Yes Yes 5% 
4 DRO Yes No No No 5% 
5 DRO Yes Yes No No 5% 
6 DRO Yes Yes Yes No 5% 
7 DRO Yes Yes Yes Yes 5% 
8 DRO Yes Yes Yes Yes 10% 
9 DRO Yes Yes Yes Yes 15% 
10 DRO Yes Yes Yes Yes 20% 
 
TABLE Ⅳ 




Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
First-stage 
cost ($) 




0 0 0 125279 133381 
Total cost ($) 843986 1031728 1037751 855096 881962 
Economic 
result 
Case 6 Case 7 Case 8 Case 9 Case 10 
First-stage 
cost ($) 




247276 248762 516593 994951 1632379 













1 Yes IES 3 
2 Yes IES 2 
3 Yes IES 4 
4 No WES 3 
5 Yes WES 3 
6 Yes WES 2 
7 Yes WES 4 
 
 
Fig. 10. Water load shedding under case 4. 
 
Fig. 11. Water load shedding under case 5. 
 
Fig. 12.  Total expected cost of cases 4 and 5. 
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5% of AIL is considered for Figs. 12 and 13. In Fig. 12, the 
second-stage expected cost under different sample size is given, 
where the black and blue curves represent cases 4 and 5, 
respectively. Overall, case 4 without considering CVaR shows 
lower second-stage expected operation cost under FDIA and 
renewable uncertainty. When 5000 second-stage samples are 
considered, the results of cases 4 and 5 approximates to 
$736000 and $800000. However, the result fluctuates when the 
data sample is below 500. In Fig. 13, the results show that the 
PLS in WES is higher than that in IES. For instance, cases 3 
and 7 yield $567000 and $648000 PLS cost, respectively. Since 
W-FDIA causes WLS and the water reservoirs and pumps 
require higher usage. Accordingly, higher power consumption 
of water pumps leads to higher PLS. For case 5, there are 2 gas 
systems and 2 water systems, which shows $47000 higher cost 
than that of case 6 with 1 gas system and 1 water system. The 
additional 2 P2G facilities and 3 water pumps thus result in 
higher power consumption.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Under the water-energy nexus era, the three proposed sub-
systems are highly interwined. The cyber-attacks on any sub-
system could propagate to the other two-subsystems. 
Consequently, this paper proposes a two-stage risk-based 
mitigation strategy for the novel WES under water-energy 
nexus. Both the day-ahead and real-time operation schemes are 
determined with FDIA on three sub-systems. The FDIA and 
renewable uncertainty are captured via the proposed RA-DRO. 
The trade-off between the economic performance and risk 
caused by cyber-attacks and renewable fluctuation is provided. 
This two-stage mitigation framework with flexible risk 
alternative is solved by a tractable Bender’s decomposition 
method. Through the extensive studies, the key findings are 
listed below:  
▪ Considering all types of FDIA, i.e., P-FDIA, G-FDIA and 
W-FDIA, leads to higher system economic loss than 
considering two types or one type of FDIA.  
▪ PLS is more sensitive to W-FDIA compared with G-FDIA. 
▪ The proposed RA-DRO mitigates the conservatism of RO 
with less load shedding.  
The economic efficiency and system security under water-
energy nexus is achieved via the effective proposed TSRA-
FMS with optimally coordinated load shedding schemes to 
protect the entire system. The end energy users will benefit 
from this better supply security. This work is especially 
practical under smart cities with enormous water-energy 
interdependencies.  
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